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Abstract 
In this contribution we will address the main puzzling empirical issues that have been formulated around Free Indi-
rect Discourse (FID): the constraints on the use of first person pronouns and of proper names (as well as of definite 
descriptions), the reasons why different grammatical features (person, gender, number) give rise to presuppositions 
that must be resolved at different levels of interpretation in FID, the factors that account for the observation that 
person and tense behave similarly in FID. At the same time, we will also discuss the main controversies to which the 
ongoing debate on FID has given rise in the literature, showing that Schlenker (Mind Lang 19(3):279–304, 2004)’s 
distinction between a Context of Thought (CT) and a Context of Utterance (CU) still provides a fundamentally valid 
insight into the nature of FID, in spite of many qualifications that are necessary and some well-motivated criticism. 
However, our main task here is more ambitious than simply taking a stand on the many unsettled controversies sur-
rounding FID. In fact, we claim that Schlenker’s split between CU and CT can be derived in a principled way from the 
inner nature of FID as a linguistic process of ‘phenomenal identification’, whereby a Higher Experiencer attempts at 
reproducing (at a distinct time) the phenomenal experience proper to a Lower Experiencer. This distinction between 
qualitatively identified but numerically distinct experiences provides the conceptual basis for the derivation of virtu-
ally all remarkable properties of FID (including its somehow intermediate status between Direct and Indirect Dis-
course), while connecting, at the same time, with some intriguing semantic properties of first-person pronouns, such 
as the different varieties of de se readings.
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Background
FID is a narrative style that is used to report the words or 
thoughts of a character.1 Its correct semantic characteri-
zation as well as its precise status with respect to direct 
and indirect discourse is still largely debated. Banfield 
(1982) notices that FID displays features of both types of 
discourse.2 Consider the following example:
(1) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of 
another school week! (Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 
185, London Heinemann 1971; example used by Ban-
field (1982, p. 98)
1 For a recent overview, see Reboul et al. (2015).
2 However, it should also be noticed that Banfield’s analysis reduces FID to 
a form of direct discourse.
As in direct discourse, the narrator is reporting the per-
spective of the protagonist. This is particularly clear in 
the use of the temporal indexical tomorrow, which, in 
the reporting FID, clearly is understood relatively to the 
temporal perspective of the character whose thoughts are 
reported. In this respect, FID behaves as a direct report.
Furthermore, FID is ‘free’ in that it needs not be intro-
duced by a superordinate clause, such as x said/thought 
that, although a framing expression, such as x said/
thought, can be added as a parenthetical:
(2) Tomorrow was Monday, she thought/said, Monday, 
the beginning of another school week!
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It seems, therefore, that most features of the discourse or 
thought reported are preserved in FID, similarly to what 
happens with direct discourse.
However, contrary to what we find in direct discourse, 
tense and pronouns reflect the narrator’s perspective, as 
would be the case in indirect discourse.3 For example, the 
past tense was in (1) is evaluated relatively to the narra-
tor’s perspective, as it would be in indirect discourse; 
unless we adopt a dual-voice account, where both the 
perspectives of the author and those of the character are 
represented, this would be paradoxical.
The following set of examples further elucidates the 
pattern we have described:
(3)  a.  Direct discourse: Mary thought, ‘Tomorrow is my 
birthday.’
 b.  Indirect discourse: Mary thought that the next day 
was her birthday.
 c. FID: Tomorrow was her birthday, Mary thought.
Notice in particular how, in FID, tomorrow is main-
tained as in a direct report, whereas the present tense 
and first person pronoun are modified as if they were 
occurring in an indirect report. Thus there are quite a few 
puzzles about FID.
In this contribution we will address the main puzzling 
empirical issues that have been identified around Free 
Indirect Discourse (FID): the constraints on the use of first-
person pronouns and of proper names (as well as of defi-
nite descriptions), the reasons why different grammatical 
features (person, gender, number) give rise to presupposi-
tions that must be resolved at different levels of interpre-
tation in FID, the factors that account for the observation 
that person and tense behave similarly in FID. At the same 
time, we will also discuss the main controversies to which 
the ongoing debate on FID has given rise in the literature, 
showing that Schlenker (2004)’s distinction between a 
Context of Thought (CT) and a Context of Utterance (CU) 
still provides a fundamentally valid insight into the nature 
of FID, in spite of many qualifications that are necessary 
and some well-motivated criticisms. However, our main 
task here is more ambitious than simply taking a stand on 
the many unsettled controversies surrounding FID. In fact, 
we claim that Schlenker’s split between CU and CT can be 
derived in a principled way from the inner nature of FID as 
a linguistic process of ‘phenomenal identification’, whereby 
a Higher Experiencer attempts at reproducing (at a distinct 
time) the phenomenal experience proper to a Lower Expe-
riencer. This distinction between qualitatively identified 
3 For a recent analysis of indirect reports, effectively combining semantic 
and pragmatic considerations, see Capone (2010, 2016).
but numerically distinct experiences provides the con-
ceptual basis for the derivation of virtually all remarkable 
properties of FID (including its somehow intermediate 
status between Direct and Indirect Discourse), while con-
necting, at the same time, with some intriguing semantic 
properties of first-person pronouns, such as the different 
varieties of de se readings. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. In the first and second sections, we critically discuss 
some of the previous approaches to FID, concentrating on 
the contrasting proposals in Schlenker (2004) and Maier 
(2015). In the third section, we will present the main fea-
tures of our analysis of FID as a linguistic process of phe-
nomenal identification, by emphasizing both its cognitive 
and linguistic relevance. At the end, we will provide a short 
summary of the main results achieved.
Two analyses of FID
In this section, we present two analyses of FID that we 
believe are representative of two main different classes of 
approaches to FID. We first present Schlenker (2004), as 
the most significant representative of those approaches 
[primarily developing ideas introduced in Banfield 
(1982)] that regard FID as a result of some operation of 
context shift. We then consider the most relevant criti-
cisms formulated against the context shift approach [in 
particular, the criticisms put forward by Maier (2015) and 
Reboul (2013)]. We finally present the analysis of Maier 
(2015), as representative of those approaches that regard 
FID as a case of mixed quotation.
FID as context shift: Schlenker (2004)
Schlenker (2004) uses FID as the basis for proposing a 
distinction between two types of contexts of evaluation, 
context of thought and context of utterance, and two corre-
sponding types of indexicality: (a) ‘Referential’ indexicals 
and demonstratives, which receive their denotation from 
the context of thought; (b) pronouns and tenses, which 
depend on the context of utterance. Schlenker further 
suggests that there may be a principled reason for the pro-
posed distinction. The meaning of ‘referential’ indexicals 
and demonstratives is lexically specified and depends on 
the intentions of the speaker/thinker; such expressions are 
hence evaluated relatively to the context of thought. On 
the other hand, pronouns and tenses are assumed to be 
variables whose domain of reference is restricted by gram-
matical features, such as gender, person, and tense; such 
features “serve as a system of classification whose refer-
ential domain is the utterance itself” (Schlenker 2004, p. 
280); hence, their dependency on the context of utterance.
Schlenker (2004) shows that the distinction he proposes 
can also account for another reporting style, the histori-
cal present. Whereas in FID the actual context is identified 
with the context of utterance and the context of thought 
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corresponds to that of the reported speech or thought, 
in the historical present the opposite applies: the context 
of thought is identified with the actual context whereas 
the context of utterance is that of the reported speech or 
thought. The historical present is, Schlenker contends, one 
of the combinatorial possibilities expected once the distinc-




Maier (2015) discusses two main arguments against 
Schlenker’s proposal. In particular, with reference to the 
pronominal domain, Maier provides evidence that in FID 
(i) not all pronouns are evaluated relative to the context 
of utterance and (ii) not only pronouns are evaluated rel-
ative to the context of utterance.
Evidence for the first conclusion comes from the inter-
pretation of the gender features of third person pronouns 
in FID [a problem already observed by Schlenker (2004), 
following Doron (1990)]. Consider the following example:
(4) [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, 
Robin was a woman.]
 a.  Where was he this morning, for instance? (Mary 
wondered.)
     (Example from Schlenker 2004, p. 291)
 b.  #Where was she this morning, for instance? (Mary 
wondered.)
The felicitous use of he and the infelicitous use of she in the 
examples above show that the gender features of the pro-
nouns depend on the protagonist’s perspective, rather than 
on the narrator’s perspective. In Schlenker’s system, this 
would mean that they are evaluated relative to the context 
of thought, and not relative to the context of utterance. 
This fact contradicts Schlenker’s claim that pronouns are 
always interpreted relatively to the context of utterance; in 
fact, at least their gender features must be evaluated rela-
tive to the perspective of the author of the reported speech 
or thought. Schlenker (2004, p. 291) tentatively suggests, 
as a possible solution to this issue, that he in the example 
above is a pronoun of laziness, standing for an elided defi-
nite description. However, Maier rightly suggests that this 
is more of a stipulation than of a solution.
Evidence for the second conclusion comes from the 
observation that a ‘transparency effect’ (that is, evalu-
ation in the context of utterance) is often achieved by 
replacing a second- or third-person pronoun with a 
proper name. Consider the following text fragment (from 
Maier 2015):
(5) Bill and Eric were fighting, when Sookie stepped 
between them. Did Bill really think he could chal-
lenge his boss like that? she demanded, before turn-
ing to Eric. And what the hell was HE thinking?
Here, we adopt the convention of signaling FID by put-
ting the relevant portions of text in bold. Notice that 
the first occurrence of “Bill” in FID (as well as the third-
person pronoun that immediately follows) stands for a 
mapping from a second-person to a name, since what 
Sookie actually utters in the context of thought is a sen-
tence such as “Do you really think you can challenge your 
boss like that?”. Notice also that in the second fragment of 
FID the third-person he also stands for a mapping from a 
second-person to a name, since mapping FID into direct 
discourse would produce here an output along the lines 
of “And what the hell are you thinking?”
These observations clearly warrant the conclusion that 
transparency is not limited to pronouns, it also extends 
to names. At the same time, they raise the question why 
a second-person pronoun is sometimes shifted into a 
third-person pronoun and sometimes shifted into a 
name.
Reboul (2013)
Reboul also presents some potentially decisive argu-
ments against Schlenker’s view that pronouns are nec-
essarily interpreted relatively to the context of utterance 
in FID. Consider the following fragment from Flaubert’s 
L’Éducation sentimentale:
(6) Before he left for the holidays, he [Frédéric] had the 
idea of a picnic, to close the Saturday meetings. He 
was cheerful. Mme Arnoux was at her mother’s in 
Chartres. But he would soon meet her again and 
would succeed at becoming her lover.
In fact, we know that Frédéric becomes Mme Arnoux’s 
lover only in the context of thought, which is different 
from the real context, whereas in the context of utter-
ance, the real context, Frédéric never becomes Mme 
Arnoux’s lover. So, it must be the case that he in (6) refers 
to the Frédéric of the context of thought, rather than to 
the Frédéric of the context of utterance. This entails that 
there are contexts when the referent of a pronoun is 
picked up in the context of thought and not in the con-
text of utterance—pace Schlenker.
Reboul also offers a version of the same argument 
involving the first- rather than the third-person. Con-
sider the fragment in (6), from Modiano’s novel Accident 
nocturne:
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(6) I drew out of my pocket the “report” I had signed. So 
she was living in the square de l’Alboni. I knew that 
place because I had often got down at the nearest 
underground station. No problem that the number 
was missing. With the name: Jacqueline Beauser-
gent, I would manage
In this novel, the protagonist (who is also the narrator, 
that is, Modiano) is looking for a young woman who has 
run him down in her car. The address on the “report” is 
incomplete, but the protagonist thinks he will “manage” to 
find her nevertheless. However, in the novel, he does not 
find the young woman and the narrator (the present time 
Modiano who is writing the story) knows that he will not. 
In other words, we have here a situation in which Modi-
ano (the referent of the first-person pronoun “I” in the 
FID fragment) finds Jacqueline Beausergent only relatively 
to the context of thought and, crucially, not relatively to 
the context of utterance. It must thus be the case that “I” 
in (6) refers to the Modiano of the context of thought, and 
not to the Modiano of the context of utterance. The use 
of the first-person pronoun in (6) exactly parallels the use 
of the third-person pronoun in (5), since these are occur-
rences in which the pronoun is interpreted relatively to 
the context of thought and not relatively to the context of 
utterance, as predicted by Schlenker.
FID as mixed quotation: Maier (2015)
Maier’s proposal is that FID represents a form of ‘mixed 
quotation’, with a strong prevalence of linguistic main 
clause indicators (direct questions, discourse particles 
and expressive elements reflecting the protagonist’s per-
spective, etc.) and metalinguistic main clause indicators 
(typographical elements, shift to dialect, etc.). As an 
example, Maier proposes the logical form in (7b) for a 
FID such as (7a).
(7)  a.  Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. Tomorrow 
was her 6 year anniversary with Spencer and it had 
been the best 6 years of her life.
 b.  Ashley was lying in bed freaking out. ‘Tomorrow 
[was] [her] 6 year anniversary with Spencer and it 
[had] been the best 6 years of [her] life’.
The analysis is based on two chief ingredients: First, 
a mechanism of quoting, represented in (7b) as ‘…’, 
which indicates that the expressions occurring inside 
it are mentioned—they refer to themselves qua linguis-
tic objects—and not just used to refer to objects in the 
world; secondly, a mechanism of ‘unquoting’, represented 
in (7b) by the square brackets […], which suspends the 
quotation.
In other words, according to the analysis proposed by 
Maier, FID is a direct discourse where some elements 
of the quoted discourse are unquoted. Which elements 
in the sentence get unquoted is a matter of pragmatics. 
It is still poorly understood which pragmatic principles 
govern the availability of the unquotation mechanism. 
What needs be done—in Maier’s view—is a case-by-case 
analysis of the pragmatic factors that motivate the limited 
amount of unquotations in FID.
Comparison between the two analyses
In 1.2 we have considered a number of arguments that 
have been raised against the analysis proposed by Schlen-
ker (2004). In this section we look at some of these argu-
ments in some more detail.
We begin with the argument regarding gender in FID. 
We have seen above that gender features as expressed on 
pronouns are actually interpreted relative to the context 
of thought, rather than to the context of utterance. In 
which sense is this an argument against Schlenker? We 
think it shows that the reason why pronouns are inter-
preted in the context of utterance cannot consist in the 
fact that pronouns (as well as tenses) are variables. In 
fact, once pronouns are decomposed into bundles of 
grammatical features (gender, number, person), it should 
rather be emphasized that some of these features (gender 
and, as we will see in a moment, number) are interpreted 
relatively to the context of thought (CT), whereas other 
features, namely person, are interpreted relatively to the 
context of utterance (CU). To see this in some detail, 
consider again the example discussed above, in a slightly 
different version. Suppose Mary was addressing Robin 
and, therefore, was using a second person pronoun in her 
original speech:
(7) [Mary was talking to Robin, who she believes to be a 
man, but who is actually a woman]
 Where had he been all morning, for instance? Mary 
asked her.
 (from Maier (2015))
Here, it is important to notice that the pronoun origi-
nally used in Mary’s speech is ‘you’ and not ‘he’. If we had 
reported Mary’s speech as an instance of direct discourse, 
we would have got: “Where have YOU been all morning, 
for instance?” This observation clearly shows that if the 
person presupposition encoded by the pronoun we have 
in FID (i.e. ‘HE’) had to be satisfied in CT, it would fail, 
since a third-person feature is not able to refer to the 
addressee in CT. It follows that the third-person feature 
in ‘he’ is satisfied in CU, where the intended referent (i.e. 
Robin) is neither the addressee nor the speaker.
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From Maier’s perspective, this means that pronouns 
should be decomposed into feature bundles, where each 
feature, having an independent semantic value, can be 
quoted or unquoted independently [an analysis origi-
nally suggested by Doron (1990)]. However, there is an 
important sense according to which feature decomposi-
tion might work as well for Schlenker: gender features 
behave as demonstratives and referential indexicals (they 
are evaluated in CT), whereas person features behave as 
tenses (they are evaluated in CU). It is thus worth 
emphasizing that, once feature decomposition is 
assumed, the behavior of gender in FID is not, in itself, a 
decisive argument in favor of Maier’s ‘mixed quotation’ 
approach. Nor is it a decisive argument against Schlenk-
er’s distinction between CU and CT. Indeed, what is lost 
of Schlenker’s original account is the idea that pronouns 
and tenses depend on the context of utterance because 
they denote variables. Once feature decomposition is 
assumed, what needs to be explained is what distin-
guishes person and tense from other morphological 
features.4
Before continuing, let us briefly see that number 
behaves as gender in FID: suppose Mary is actually mar-
ried to two husbands without knowing it (one might 
4 It is interesting to observe that independent arguments can be presented 
in favor of the idea that person features are evaluated relative to context 
of thought whereas gender features are evaluated relative to the context 
of utterance. Basing himself on a sample of more than one hundred lan-
guages, Baker (2008) observes that subject-verb agreement is the only con-
figuration that licenses person-agreement. Baker makes sense of this data 
by proposing the Structural Condition on Person Agreement (SCOPA), 
which basically restricts person-agreement to strictly local configurations. 
In order to account for SCOPA, Baker proposes that Person inherently 
triggers an A-bar dependency. The reason is that person features are not 
inherently generated on the agreeing noun but are basically induced from 
outside by means of a sort of operator-variable agreement (see also Kratzer 
2009; Delfitto and Fiorin 2011, 2014a: that is, person features are base-
generated at the clause level and copied by Agree on the agreeing noun 
phrase by means of an operator-variable dependency (that is, an A-bar-
dependency). The picture that emerges is one whereby gender features 
are base-generated on NPs whereas person features are base-generated in 
a dedicated position in the left periphery of the clause; they are transmit-
ted to NPs by means of Agreement. Person features, syntactically, are more 
similar to Tense than to gender features. There is a semantic counterpart 
to these syntactic considerations. In some languages, first and second per-
son features can be interpreted relatively to a reported context of utterance 
(Anand 2006; Anand and Nevins 2004; Delfitto and Fiorin 2011, 2014a; 
Schlenker 1999, 2003). In such languages, the counterpart of the English 
sentence John said that I am a hero is ambiguous between two interpreta-
tions: (1) John said that the speaker is a hero; (2) John said that John is a 
hero. In the second reading, I is interpreted as the speaker in the ‘reported’ 
speech act. These languages show that the interpretation of person features 
can be manipulated by scope taking operators. The same does not hold for 
gender features. Cooper (1983) analyzes gender features as introducing 
presuppositions that he calls “indexical”, in the sense that they must always 
be resolved globally (cf. Yanovich (2010) for some relevant qualifications). 
To see how this is intended to work, compare the sentence Bill said that 
the Queen of France talked for two hours, where the presupposition of the 
complement of ‘said’ need not project to the actual world, with Bill said 
that she talked for two hours, where the gender presupposition of ‘she’ 
must project to the actual world.
think of one of the canonical ‘comedy of the errors’ 
scenario’s, where two male twins actually alternate in 
Mary’s life, while she believes it’s always the same per-
son). Consider now the scenario and the instance of FID 
in (8):
(8)   [Recently Mary observed that her husband Robin 
behaves rather inconsistently, without knowing that 
this inconsistency is due to the fact that two persons, 
Robin and Robert, play the role of her husband]
 a.  Tomorrow she would ask HIM how HE could 
behave so strangely – Mary thought
 b.  # Tomorrow she would ask THEM how THEY 
could behave so strangely – Mary thought
Notice that it is not the case that plural number, in this 
sort of settings, is generally excluded. Given the proper 
context, plural is readily permitted in indirect discourse. 
Suppose for instance that we had to rephrase the FID in 
(8a) into indirect discourse. The outcome in (9) would be 
a perfectly natural option, an option in which singular 
number, as it would occur in direct discourse, is turned 
into plural number:
(9) I am very concerned about what might happen to 
Robin and Robert. I understood Mary intends to ask 
THEM how THEY could behave so strangely
On these grounds, we conclude that when a second-
person pronoun (‘you’) is used in direct discourse, the 
reason why it cannot be maintained in FID is that per-
son features (contrary to gender and number features) 
amount to presuppositions that cannot be satisfied in CT. 
Crucially, the analysis of how pronouns behave in FID 
involves feature decomposition, but this is a conclusion 
to be drawn independently of the analysis that is ulti-
mately adopted.
The second argument raised against Schlenker’s analy-
sis concerns the use of proper names in FID. Maier pro-
vides evidence that not only pronouns and tenses are 
evaluated relatively to CU, but also proper names can 
be evaluated relatively to the CU. We believe that the 
facts concerning proper names in FID are significantly 
more complex. In particular, it is not the case that proper 
names can be used transparently in FID. Consider the 
following example as well as the two possible continua-
tions in (10a) and (10b):
(10)  Bill had become friend with Sam, who had recently 
moved in the neighborhood. What Bill didn’t know 
was that Sam’s real name was not Sam, but Moriarty, 
a dangerous criminal using that anonymous neigh-
borhood as a safe place to hide from the police. Later 
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that afternoon, Bill took the phone and dialed Sam’s 
number:
 a. Would Sam like to join him for dinner, he asked the 
moment Sam picked up the phone.
 b. #Would Moriarty like to join him for dinner, he 
asked the moment Sam picked up the phone.
Notice how, in the given scenario, (10a) is a sound con-
tinuation, whereas (10b) is not. The examples strongly 
suggest that there is a further condition to be fulfilled 
in order for proper names to be used correctly in FID: 
Informally, a proper name can be used in FID only if it 
is recognized as a valid name for its referent by the per-
son whose words or thoughts are reported. In Schlen-
ker’ terms, this can be accommodated by assuming that 
proper names can be used at the condition that their 
referential function is recognized in CT: The protagonist 
must be aware of the referential function of the name; 
that is, the epistemic state she is in must be one which 
allows her to use that name in order to refer to the pur-
ported referent. In example (10b), ‘Moriarty’ cannot be 
used felicitously because Sam does not recognize ‘Mori-
arty’ as a valid means to refer to the individual Sam; that 
is, the name ‘Moriarty’ is not recognized in CT as refer-
ring to the same individual as the name “Sam”.
On the basis of this and similar examples, we conclude 
that the use of proper names in FID is considerably less 
transparent than is claimed by Maier.5 In fact, not only 
proper names do not offer a decisive argument against 
Schlenker’s proposal, rather their behavior in FID can actu-
ally be successfully described by relying precisely on the 
distinction between CT and CU that Schlenker proposes.
To summarize, we believe that there are theoreti-
cally more or less plausible ways to defend Schlenker’s 
proposal against some of the arguments put forward by 
Maier and Reboul. In particular, we have seen that: (i) the 
behavior of gender features in FID can be accounted for 
by assuming that pronouns are decomposed into inde-
pendent morphological features, as independently main-
tained by Maier; (ii) proper names (as well as definite 
descriptions) can replace a pronoun in FID, but only at 
the condition that their referential function applies in CT. 
At least as far as these aspects are concerned, we con-
clude that it is possible to modify Schlenker’s theory in 
5 Similar considerations can be made for referential uses of definite descrip-
tions. Let us imagine that Bill became acquainted with the man living next 
door, unware of his identity with a very suspicious man Bill saw late at 
night wearing a brown hat. In this scenario (1) seems an appropriate way 
to report in FID Bill’s request to invite his neighbor for dinner. On the other 
hand, (2) is not sound, in spite of the fact that the reader is aware of the 
identity between the referents of the two descriptions. 
1. Would his neighbor like to join him for dinner
2. Would the man in the brown hat like to join him for dinner.
ways that allow it to achieve the same empirical adequacy 
as Maier’s proposal.
More generally, however, we would like to conclude this 
section by pointing out a common weakness of Schlenk-
er’s and Maier’s approaches. Schlenker’s original proposal 
tries to provide a principled explanation of the distinc-
tion between pronouns and tenses, on the one hand, 
and other indexicals, on the other hand, on the basis of 
the observation that pronouns and tenses are ‘variables’. 
As we saw, this explanation cannot be maintained once 
feature decomposition is assumed. What needs to be 
explained, then, is what principled reasons determine 
that only person and tense features are evaluated rela-
tively to the context of utterance. Maier’s proposal, on 
the other hand, faces a similar problem. Maier claims that 
the mechanism of unquotation is governed by pragmatic 
principles: Which elements in the sentence get unquoted 
is a matter of pragmatics. However, Maier points out, it 
is still poorly understood which pragmatic principles 
govern the availability of the unquotation mechanism. 
What needs be done—in Maier’s view—is a case-by-case 
analysis of the pragmatic factors that motivate the lim-
ited amount of unquotations in FID, especially in order to 
understand why they are primarily restricted to tense and 
to the person features of pronouns. We conclude that, 
while both theories (with the provisions discussed above) 
provide an empirically adequate account of the semantics 
of FID, they both fail in providing a principled explana-
tion of what can and what cannot be evaluated from the 
perspective of the actual speaker.
Proposal: FID as phenomenal identification
The insight that we would like to put forward is that 
FID is an indirect discourse report in which the Higher 
Experiencer (the experiencer of the context of utterance, 
henceforth HE) reports the experience associated with 
the Lower Experiencer (the experiencer of the context 
of thought, LE) by ‘phenomenally identifying’ with this 
experience.
From this perspective, FID is different from both direct 
and indirect discourse. Let us adopt, for solely descriptive 
purposes, Schlenker’s distinction between CT—the origi-
nal context of the reported thought or speech, including 
its time, its author, etc., and CU—the context at which 
the original thought or speech is reported.
Direct discourse is represented by a main clause that 
is intended to literally reproduce the context of thought, 
by reproducing what the protagonist said or thought. 
The context of utterance of a super-ordinate clause only 
serves to introduce the report as a ‘quote’, that is, to sig-
nal that the context of thought is not to be identified with 
the context of utterance (the time at which the speech or 
thought is interpreted is not the time at which the speech 
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or thought is produced) and to signal that there is a sec-
ond utterer besides the author in the context of thought, 
that is, a different experiencer that reproduces the origi-
nal speech or thought at a different time.
The benchmark of direct discourse is that there is no 
interpretive interference between context of thought and 
context of utterance besides making clear that the con-
text of thought is not intended as featuring a presently 
developing thought but as featuring a ‘quoted’ thought.
On the other hand, FID is also different from indirect 
discourse. Indirect discourse not only makes clear that 
there is a context of utterance distinct from the context of 
the original thought, it also crucially shifts the interpre-
tive mood proper to the context of thought into the inter-
pretive mood proper to the context of utterance. This 
means that though the reported propositional content is 
intended to reproduce the content of the utterance that 
took place at a given context of thought, all the linguistic 
expressions that are used to convey this content are inter-
preted with respect to the actual context of utterance. 
This entails that what a protagonist said at a given con-
text of thought is now interpreted from the perspective of 
a different speaker.
In a nutshell, we can say that direct discourse maintains 
context of thought and context of utterance completely 
distinct, whereas indirect discourse conflates them into 
a single context. Maier’s insight is that FID is a form of 
mixed quotation: context of thought and context of utter-
ance are kept separated (as in direct discourse), but with 
a limited amount of pragmatically motivated exceptions. 
From this perspective, FID would amount to an ‘imper-
fect’ form of direct discourse. This would explain why 
virtually all linguistic and metalinguistic indicators point 
towards direct discourse.
We contend that this is a serious mistake. Pointing to 
essential similarity with direct discourse does not capture 
the fact that FID expresses the empathy of the Higher 
Experiencer (the agent in CU) with the Lower Experi-
encer (the agent in CT). On the contrary, direct discourse 
is an emotionally neutral reproduction of the content 
produced in the context of thought. The insight that we 
wish to put forward is that FID is simply a way to change 
this condition, that is, FID is a way to express empathic 
identification, from the part of the utterer in CU, with the 
experience expressed in CT, by means of adopting the 
phenomenal perspective of the protagonist in CT. Before 
discussing the evidence that supports this interpretation 
of FID, it is important to notice that indirect discourse is 
not suited to achieve empathic identification. In fact, it 
is intuitively fair to claim that indirect discourse simply 
reinterprets what was originally expressed in the origi-
nal context of thought from the new perspective of the 
context of utterance, without any inherent commitment 
to empathic identification.
Consider the following fragment, discussed by Reboul 
(2013), from Modiano’s novel Accident nocturne:
(13)  I drew out of my pocket the “report” I had signed. So 
she was living in the square de l’Alboni. I knew that 
place because I had often got down at the nearest 
underground station. No problem that the number 
was missing. With the name: Jacqueline Beauser-
gent, I would manage
In this novel, the protagonist (who is also the narrator, 
that is, Modiano) is looking for a young woman who has 
run him down in her car. The address on the “report” is 
incomplete, but the protagonist thinks he will “manage” 
to find her nevertheless. However, in the novel, we dis-
cover he does not find the young woman and the narra-
tor (the present time Modiano who is writing the story) 
knows that he won’t. In other words, we have here a 
situation in which Modiano (the referent of the first-
person pronoun “I” in the FID fragment) finds Jacqueline 
Beausergent only relatively to CT and, crucially, not rela-
tively to CU.
The use of the first-person pronoun in (13) exactly par-
allels the use of the third-person pronoun in (11), since 
these are pronoun occurrences in which the pronoun is 
interpreted in CT and not in CU. However, (13) intro-
duces a further complication. In (13), a first-person pro-
noun is used in FID to refer to the protagonist, that is, 
to LE. According to the original intuitions about FID 
expressed in Banfield (1982), this should never happen. 
Banfield claims that in contexts like (14) the first-person 
pronoun cannot be interpreted as referring to the HE (i.e. 
as referring to the narrator) but is only licensed under the 
condition that the narrator also is the addressee in CT.
(14) [situation, roughly: protagonist (she) thinks the nar-
rator is a very nice guy]
 a. #Oh how extraordinarily nice I was! she thought
 b. Oh, how extraordinarily nice I was! she told me
As noticed by Schlenker, the licensing condition on 
first-person pronouns is in fact looser than suggested 
by Banfield. In (15), the referent of “I” in FID is not the 
addressee in the context of thought, but this occurrence 
of “I” is nevertheless felicitous (the question is of course 
why):
(15) [situation, roughly: protagonist (she) thinks the nar-
rator is a very nice guy]
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 Oh how extraordinarily nice I was, she told my father, 
without realizing that I was listening to their conver-
sation.
Here, at least two questions arise: (i) Which licensing 
condition is operative in (15)? (ii) Why is the first-per-
son pronoun in (13) allowed to refer to the narrator or, 
as argued by Reboul, to the thinker in CT (remember 
that “I” should be licensed, according to Banfield, only in 
contexts where it refers to the addressee in the context of 
thought)?
In what follows, we will see how these puzzles may 
be solved by means of the following ingredients: (i) FID 
involves phenomenal identification; (ii) Schlenker’s dis-
tinction between CT and CU plays a significant theoreti-
cal role (contra Maier); (iii) the interpretative behavior of 
pronominal features and tenses with respect to CT and 
CU depends on the properties of phenomenal identifica-
tion; (iv) the eccentric behavior of first-person pronouns 
and proper names in FID depends on the conditions 
regulating the relationship between CT and CU, as 
imposed by the nature of FID as a process of phenomenal 
identification.
If FID expresses phenomenal identification with LE 
from the part of HE, it follows that the propositional con-
tent encoded by FID should be presented from the per-
spective of LE. Since HE intends to rebuild the reported 
experience in herself, adopting a perspective different 
from that of LE would not do. We propose that this prop-
erty of FID as phenomenal identification derives the first 
and main property of FID, formulated in (16):
(16)  All linguistic expressions in FID are compulsorily 
interpreted relatively to CT
What (16) is purported to capture is the fact that all 
linguistic and metalinguistic indicators in FID point to 
FID as a variant of direct discourse, in which interpre-
tation takes place relative to the context in which LE is 
the speaker/thinker. In fact, as Maier demonstrates, 
the effects of (16) are extremely pervasive: Expressives, 
demonstratives, and referential indexicals are all inter-
preted in CT, as well as grammatical features of pro-
nouns such as gender and number, as we have shown 
above. One of the consequences of (16) is thus that there 
is no real symmetry between pronouns and tenses, pace 
Schlenker (whose suggestion, remember, was that pro-
nouns and tenses are interpreted in CU because they are 
variables). As we have seen, in fact, pronouns have to be 
treated as feature bundles.
Let us then reformulate the main question addressed in 
the present article: 
(i)  Why should person and tense not be interpreted in CT, 
providing an exception to the general validity of (16)?
We contend that this follows from the ontological sta-
tus of the process of phenomenal identification. In direct 
discourse, a speaker/narrator simply reports some prop-
ositional content from the perspective of a distinct expe-
riencer (LE, according to the terminology adopted here). 
Conversely, in FID the ontological requirement that need 
to be satisfied in order for phenomenal identification to 
take place is that there be two distinct experiences and 
two distinct experiencers. HE is the experiencer1 of expe-
rience1 (taking place at t1) that is intended to be very 
similar (ideally, up to full identification) to experience2 
as lived by experiencer2 (LE) at t2, with t2 distinct from 
t1. Suppose now that all linguistic expressions in FID are 
interpreted relative to CT. How could one mark a differ-
ence with respect to direct discourse? Or more exactly, 
how could one tell that there is an attempt by HE to 
rebuild in herself the experience lived by a distinct expe-
riencer (LE) rather than to provide an emotionally neu-
tral report of what LE said or thought? Suppose further 
that this entails that some linguistic expressions have to 
be interpreted from the perspective of HE (that is, rela-
tive to the context of utterance) in order to signal that 
the original thought or speech is not simply reported, but 
rather dynamically put in relation, in the cognitive and 
emotional terms associated with phenomenal identifica-
tion, with the context of utterance. From this perspective, 
the real question boils down to the following:
(i)  Which linguistic items qualify as optimal candidates 
for interpretation in CU?
Remember that, ontologically, we have to grant the 
existence of two distinct experiencers and two distinct 
experiences. Delfitto and Fiorin (2014b) provide linguis-
tic evidence that the de se reports of certain control verbs 
(such as “imagine” and “remember”) are also unambigu-
ously immune to ‘error through misidentification’ on the 
part of the author of the reported attitude. As originally 
discussed by Higginbotham (2003), the statement “Jim 
remembers saying that John should finish his thesis by 
July” cannot be true in a scenario in which John fails to 
identify himself as the person having the experience of 
saying that John should finish his thesis by July. In fact, 
the sentence is judged as unsound in a context such as 
“Jim remembers saying that John should finish his thesis 
by July, although, now that he thinks about it, he is not 
sure it was him who he remembers saying it.” Notice, 
importantly, that the immunity to error is not conveyed 
by slightly different grammatical formats. The sentence 
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“Jim remembers himself saying that John should fin-
ish his thesis by July” does not contradict the following 
continuation: “although, now that he thinks about it, he 
is not sure it was him who he remembers saying it.” Delf-
itto and Fiorin (2014b) contend that a proper modeling of 
the semantics of these peculiar statements requires that 
experiencers and experiences be regarded as belonging to 
ontological classes distinct from individuals and events. 
In particular, two properties are of importance in the 
context of the present discussion: (i) for each experience 
there is one and only one experiencer (hence, any two 
experiences with two different experiencers are necessar-
ily different experiences); (ii) for each experience there is 
one and only one point in time at which the experience 
occurs (hence, any two experiences occurring at two dif-
ferent points in time are necessarily numerically distinct 
experiences). While we refer the reader to Delfitto and 
Fiorin (2014b) for a throughout discussion of the precise 
metaphysical status of these ontological classes and their 
consequences for a theory of meaning, in the reminder 
of this article we would like to demonstrate how the two 
properties mentioned above provide a principled answer 
to the puzzle of FID.
Let us return to our main question (i): Which linguistic 
items qualify as optimal candidates for interpretation in 
the context of utterance? Our answer is that it suffices to 
link each of the two experiences to two distinct times and 
two distinct experiencers: this is achieved by interpret-
ing tense and person in the context of utterance. After 
all, this is precisely what a process of Phenomenal Iden-
tification entails: An agent attempting to reproduce the 
subjective phenomenal experience of another agent. Ide-
ally, full identification produces two experiences that are 
equal in all regards except in that they are experienced 
by two distinct experiencers and occur at two distinct 
points in time (i.e. they are qualitatively identical though 
numerically distinguished).
As for the experiencers, remember that the semantics 
of first-person is strictly associated to self-ascription 
(see Wechsler 2010). A sentence in which one of the 
arguments is a first-person pronoun encodes the inter-
pretation according to which this argument not only cor-
responds to one of the participants of the state or event 
portrayed, but also corresponds to the bearer of the 
relevant propositional attitude in CT. In other words, 
a first-personal sentence is a sentence in which one of 
the participants in the state/event portrayed is also the 
experiencer of the mental event (speech or thought) 
whose content is the portrayed state/event. From the 
present viewpoint, we might say that one of the partici-
pants is the agent from whose perspective the relevant 
‘experience’ is reported. This becomes particularly clear 
if we adopt the view according to which a first-personal 
sentence expresses a property that need be self-ascribed 
by the speaker, and a second-personal sentence expresses 
a property that need be self-ascribed by the addressee (cf. 
Wechsler 2010). This view entails that when one listens 
to a first-personal sentence uttered by someone else, the 
only way to assess the truth-value of this sentence con-
sists in identifying with the mental state of the speaker. 
Similarly, the only way to assess a second-personal sen-
tence when one produces it (instead of listening to it) is 
for the speaker to identify with the mental state of the 
addressee.
Let us see what the consequences are for the use for the 
person-features in FID. If we use a first-person pronoun 
in a FID-context, and we interpret the person feature in 
CT, there is no way to avoid that the property expressed 
in FID be interpreted as self-ascribed by the protagonist. 
Consider an example, as in (17):
(17)   #How intelligent I was! – Elena thought
Interpreting “I” in (17) in CT entails that “I” necessarily 
refers to the experiencer in CT (i.e. Elena). One sees thus 
that this would make (17) completely equivalent to an 
instance of direct discourse of the kind: “Elena thought: 
‘How intelligent I am!’” On the other hand, if we interpret 
the first-person feature relative to CU, “I” would refer to 
the utterer of (17), that is, to HE. Why is this infelicitous? 
From the present perspective, the answer is straightfor-
ward: if “I” is interpreted in CU, (16) is violated, since “I” 
would be a linguistic expression that is not interpreted in 
CT. This is incompatible with FID and this is the reason 
why (17) is infelicitous. On these grounds, we conclude 
that we have a principled reason why first- and second-
person pronouns must be shifted to third-person (or to 
names; see the discussion above) in FID: The semantics 
of first/second person is simply incompatible with the 
nature of FID as encoding phenomenal identification. Of 
course, we have also seen in the preceding section that 
there are exceptions to the ban on first-person in FID. It 
is to these exceptions that we have to turn now.
Before doing that, however, there is a potential objec-
tion to the proposed account of Person in FID that we 
should consider at this point. One might say that if “I” 
cannot be interpreted in CU because of (16), the same 
reasoning should be applied to tense, that is, interpreting 
tense relative to CU should be equally infelicitous. How-
ever, there is a straightforward answer. Interpreting “I” in 
CU and in CT delivers two referentially distinct individu-
als (since, normally, HE is distinct from LE, that is, the 
protagonist is different from the narrator; exceptions will 
be considered below). Conversely, interpreting tense at 
CU and in CT does not deliver two referentially distinct 
times. To see this, just consider the minimal pair in (18):
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(18)   a.  Mary thought: “I will tell him to leave” (direct dis-
course)
   b.  Mary thought that she would tell him to leave 
(indirect discourse)
Based on a Reichenbachian semantics for tense, (18b) is 
usually referred to as ‘future in the past’: Mary’s saying 
takes place after Mary’s thought, but not necessarily after 
the time at which (18b) is uttered. The difference between 
the two tenses in (18) reduces to differences in the rela-
tional values of the relevant utterance times, event times 
and reference times. In absolute terms, however, inter-
preting the tense in the context of thought [as is the case 
in (18a)] or in the context of utterance [as is the case in 
(18b)] does not deliver two distinct times, rather it deliv-
ers, in absolute terms, the very same time along the time 
axis. It is worth noticing that these considerations not 
only provide an answer to the potential objection formu-
lated above. They also make clear that there is a sort of 
uniformity condition operating on FID: The interpretive 
result that we get when we shift the interpretation of a 
linguistic item or grammatical feature in FID from CT 
to CU must preserve, in some sense to be defined, some 
essential aspects of the interpretation that we would get 
by interpreting that very same item or feature in CT. 
In the case of tense, as we have seen, uniformity can be 
understood as numerical identity in extensional terms. 
The natural question is what this means in the case of 
Person. Significantly, answering this question is tanta-
mount to deriving the eccentric features of first-person 
and names in FID that we have reviewed above.
Let us start with Reboul’s example from Modiano, 
reproduced below as (19). One of the problems that this 
example raises for the traditional analysis of FID (as Ban-
field’s) is that the first-person pronoun appears to be per-
fectly legitimate. Why?
(19)  I drew out of my pocket the “report” I had signed. So 
she was living in the square de l’Alboni. I knew that 
place because I had often got down at the nearest 
underground station. No problem that the number 
was missing. With the name: Jacqueline Beauser-
gent, I would manage
What distinguishes (19) from the cases in which a first-
person pronoun is excluded is the fact that the situation 
described is one in which the narrator phenomenally 
identifies with an experience that he himself lived, at a 
preceding time. So, though there are two distinct expe-
riences (the one Modiano is in at the moment he writes 
and the one he was in at the moment he was looking for 
the woman who had run him down) and two different 
experiencers (Modiano as the narrator at t1 and Modiano 
as the protagonist at t2), the narrator and the protagonist 
are extensionally identified. Since the individual referred 
to by “I” is—extensionally—the same individual in CT 
and in CU, it is fair to claim that shifting the interpreta-
tion of “I” from CT to CU does not violate the uniformity 
condition that we have argued is operative in the case of 
tense. Conversely, this is clearly not so in cases such as 
(17): here, shifting “I” from CT to CU involves a radical 
referent change [since Elena and the narrator are clearly 
referentially distinct in (17)].
However, there are reasons to think that in the case 
of Person, the application of the uniformity condition 
results in an interpretive requirement that is weaker than 
extensional identity between the referent of “I” in CT and 
the referent of “I” in CU. Consider in this respect (14b), 
reproduced here as (20):
(20) Oh, how extraordinarily nice I was! She told me
Under the working hypothesis that we are defending 
here, according to which FID expresses phenomenal 
identification between narrator and protagonist, the nar-
rator in (20) is trying to identify with the experience lived 
by the female protagonist. Clearly, the referent of “I” in 
CT is the female protagonist, whereas the referent of 
“me” in the context of utterance is the narrator, a distinct 
character. There is thus no extensional identity between 
the referent of the first-person pronoun in the context 
of thought and in the context of utterance. Strikingly 
enough, however, the first-person pronoun is perfectly 
legitimate in (20) as referring to the narrator, in spite of 
the fact that uniformity, as defined above, is violated. 
Again, the question is why this is so.
We think that this question also admits a principled 
answer, which eventually elucidates the actual condi-
tions of use of first-person in FID. Here is the basic 
insight. There is a sense according to which “I” in (20), 
interpreted in CU as referring to the narrator, retains a 
first-personal interpretation in CT. It is in this sense—we 
claim—that uniformity is satisfied in the shift from CT to 
CU. To see why this is the case, consider the fact that, as 
observed by Banfield, the role of the narrator in the con-
text of thought is that of addressee. In other words, map-
ping FID into direct discourse would deliver a sentence 
like “How extraordinarily nice you are!”, where ‘you’ refers 
to the narrator. This means that in CT the referent of 
“I”—the narrator—is the addressee of the sentence “How 
extraordinarily nice you are!”. In terms of self-ascription, 
this entails that the narrator, as the addressee in context 
of thought, self-ascribes, in the context of thought, the 
property ‘λx. x is extraordinarily nice’. This amounts to 
a sort of de se effect in CT, relative to the referent of “I” 
in the context of utterance, i.e. the narrator. In CT, the 
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narrator undergoes a first-personal interpretation: he is 
not simply the individual of whom the property ‘λx. x is 
extraordinarily nice’ holds, he is also the individual who 
is aware of the fact that this property holds of himself. 
This is the reason why we speak of a ‘de se effect’. And this 
is the reason—we submit—why uniformity is satisfied in 
(20): the narrator operates as a center of consciousness 
(that is, in a first-personal way) both in CT and in CU.
This interpretation is immediately confirmed by 
Schlenker’s observation that a first-person pronoun is 
licensed in FID not only in cases such as (20), where the 
referent of “I” is the addressee in context of thought, but 
also in cases such as (21), in which the referent of “I” is 
not the addressee (the addressee is the narrator’s father):
(21) [situation, roughly: protagonist (she) thinks the nar-
rator is a very nice guy]
 Oh how extraordinarily nice I was, she told my 
father, without realizing that I was listening to their 
conversation
From the present perspective, this kind of extensions in 
the legitimate usage of the first-person pronouns in FID 
loses all its puzzling aspect. In fact, notice that though 
the narrator is not the addressee in (21), it is the narra-
tor who self-ascribes the property ‘λx. x is extraordi-
narily nice’. Mapping FID in (21) into direct discourse 
would deliver a sentence like “How extraordinarily nice 
[narrator’s name] is!” In CT, the narrator listens to this 
sentence, and is aware of the fact that the referent of the 
narrator’s name is he himself. For the narrator, the sen-
tence is thus equivalent, in CT, to the sentence “How 
extraordinarily nice I am!”, whereby the narrator self-
ascribes the property ‘λx. x is extraordinarily nice’. Again, 
the narrator operates as the center of consciousness both 
in CT and in CU, the uniformity condition is satisfied 
and the first-person pronoun is perfectly felicitous as it 
occurs in FID.
These ideas lend themselves in a natural way to a solu-
tion of the puzzles that we have discussed in the preced-
ing section with regard to the use of proper names in 
FID. The two main issues revolve around the reasons why 
(i) sometimes a name is chosen instead of a third-person 
pronoun when mapping from CT to CU takes place in 
FID; (ii) the chosen name must be recognized by the per-
son whose speech or thought is reported (LE) as a valid 
name for the intended referent. Let us start with (ii), i.e. 
the ‘transparency condition’ on proper names. A case in 
point is the contrast, reproduced below, between (22a) 
and (22b).
(22)  [Mrs Cabot—the person whose words are reported—
recognizes Arnie’s voice. However, Arnie is not 
known to her with the name “Arnie”, but with the 
name “Ortcutt”]
 a.  #Arnie had had his last chance with her, that voice 
said, and he had blown it
 b.  Ortcutt had had his last chance with her, that voice 
said, and he had blown it
The difference between (22a) and (22b) can be elucidated 
in terms of a de se effect, present in (22b) and absent in 
(22a). In (22) Mrs Cabot is aware in CT of the fact that 
the person she is talking to is named Ortcutt, whereas 
she is not aware that this person is (also) named Arnie. 
It follows that the semantics of the second-person pro-
noun that would occur in direct discourse (“You’ve had 
your last chance with me, and you’ve blown it”) can be 
reconstructed only at the level of CU in (22a), where the 
narrator is aware of the extensional identity between 
Arnie and Mrs Cabot’s interlocutor, whereas it can 
already be reconstructed at the level of CT in (22b), 
where Mrs Cabot herself, as the protagonist, is aware of 
the identity between Ortcutt and her interlocutor. We 
conclude that (22b) provides a context in which map-
ping a second-person pronoun into a name (activating 
the context of utterance as a further interpretive layer) 
does not destroy the original second-person semantics in 
the context of thought: Under the detected de se effect, 
not only the narrator but also the protagonist would be 
in condition to recover the original content of the pro-
tagonist’s speech. This condition is not satisfied in (22a), 
where only the narrator can rebuild Mrs Cabot’s original 
speech. We propose this is a uniformity violation (in the 
sense defined above) and that this is thus the reason why 
FID is infelicitous in (22a).
Consider next the issue concerning the choice of a 
proper name (instead of a third-person pronoun) in FID. 
A case in point is reproduced below as (23):
(23)  Bill and Eric were fighting, when Sookie stepped 
between them. Did Bill really think he could chal-
lenge his boss like that? she demanded, before turn-
ing to Eric. And what the hell was HE thinking?
From the narrator perspective (i.e. from a context of 
utterance perspective) the use of a third-person pronoun 
in place of the underlined occurrence of “Bill” in (23) 
would be referentially opaque: Is Sookie addressing Bill 
or Eric in the given context? On the other hand, (23) also 
shows that once a name has been used to circumvent ref-
erential opacity, FID can be continued by using a third-
person pronoun. A similar case, where the proper name 
stands for a first-personal original thought, is shown in 
(24) below [drawn from Reboul et al. (2015)]. Here, given 
previous mention of Mrs. Wix, the use of a third-person 
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pronoun (‘she’) would turn out ambiguous on the side of 
the narrator:
(24)  The only mystification in this was the imposing time 
of life that her [Maisie’s] elders spoke of as youth. 
For Sir Claude then Mrs. Beale was “young”, just as 
for Mrs. Wix Sir Claude was (…). What therefore was 
Maisie herself, and, in another relation to the matter, 
what therefore was mamma? (James 2011 (1897), loc. 
51112).
Conclusions
In this contribution, we have proposed that the need for 
additional semantic parameters in the interpretation of 
FID (mainly the split between a Context of Thought and 
a Context of Utterance) stems from the nature of FID as 
encoding a linguistic process of phenomenal identifica-
tion. We have shown how this analysis provides evidence 
for the sensitivity of higher-order cognitive systems such 
as language to an ontology of experiences, whereby two 
distinct experiencers end up sharing the same qualita-
tive experience, based on two numerically distinct expe-
riences. In this way, the analysis of FID sheds new light 
on the rich cognitive and linguistic interplay that charac-
terizes first-personal interpretations in natural language. 
Quite interestingly, and decisively for the particular pur-
poses that we intended to pursue here, we have argued 
that not only the nature of FID as intermediate between 
Direct and Indirect Discourse, but also many of the most 
puzzling properties of FID (including the elusive similar 
behavior of Person and Tense) can be derived as a lin-
guistic reflex of some basic cognitive requirement associ-
ated with the process of phenomenal identification. Last 
but not least, we have tried to offer, on many points, a 
fine-grained analysis of some of the most debated linguis-
tic properties of FID.
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